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In educating students national public school systems around the globe use different 
methods of grouping (or ungrouping) students by ability across schools. Some countries 
such as Germany, pre-1960s U.K., China and Singapore adopt selective systems based 
on school entrance exams to place students to schools; other countries such as U.S., 
contemporary U.K. and South Korea employ comprehensive systems based on 
residential school districts to allocate students. 
Within the group of countries that rely on selective systems, the starting point of 
ability grouping across schools varies in the procession of schooling, although most 
countries adopt mixed-ability schooling in an early part of primary education. For 
example, Germany first divides different-ability children into different school tracks 
(Gymnasium, Realschule and Hauptschule) at age 10; prior to school reforms in 1960s 
U.K. placed children to different types of schools according to ability (grammar and 
secondary modern schools) at age 11; China and Singapore send primary-school 
graduates to ability-stratified secondary schools at age 13; Japan employs similar 
grouping at age 16. In contrast, such ability grouping across schools does not exist in 
countries that in principle adopt comprehensive systems of public primary and 
secondary education, although ability-tracking within mixed-ability schools is exercised 
in some cases (e.g., U.S.; rare in South Korea). 
Despite the heated debates for last decades as to whether to group students by ability 
and from when to group them, educational experts and parents have yet to reach 
consensus on these issues. Proponents of comprehensive systems argue that the major   2
objective of a school system is to provide equal educational opportunities to all students 
irrespective of family and social backgrounds. They contend that by giving students 
rights to attend any school in the neighborhood, education can serve as a method for 
narrowing educational inequality (Jenkins et al., forthcoming; Leschinsky and Mayer, 
1990; Oakes, 1985). In contrast, advocates of selective systems argue that selective 
schooling maximizes educational outcomes because it is easier for teachers to instruct 
groups of students with a low variance of ability and for students to learn with similar-
ability students in school (Gamoran, 1986; Lazear, 2001). They also believe that a 
selective system is more fair since student allocation is based upon ability alone, not 
upon family background.
1 
In contrast to grown interests in school systems of student allocation, economic 
studies of education are rare that directly deal with educational implications of 
comprehensive and selective school systems. Even more scarce are studies that examine 
an optimal timing and sequence of ability grouping across schools in terms of efficient 
and equitable educational production.
2 
Nevertheless, there exist four papers that are directly related to school systems. 
Benabou (1996) examines implications of ability grouping and mixing of students, 
arguing that ability mixing tends to slow down the short-run growth but raise the long-
run growth. Fernandez and Gali (1999) compare the relative performance of markets 
and tournaments---ability grouping by a test---in an economy with borrowing 
constraints. They show that tournaments dominate markets in terms of matching 
efficiency. Lazear (2001) investigates how educational outputs are affected by grouping 
methods of different-quality students to show that the total educational output is 
maximized when students are grouped according to quality. Finally, Hur and Kang 
(2007) rely on a simple economic model for households' choices on consumption and 
educational investments to explore varying educational implications of comprehensive 
                                            
1 Further details on comprehensive and selective schooling and their effects on education are well 
surveyed by Gamoran and Mare (1989), Ireson and Hallam (1999), Kerckhoff (1986) and Slavin (1987, 
1990) among others. 
2 This situation is a little surprising given that such issues are under continuing discussions in many 
countries, and often more emphasized outside North America than school resource effectiveness (e.g., 
Hanushek and Woessmann, 2006). Recent research in economics of education that shows the presence of 
positive and nonlinear peer effects in primary and secondary education also underscores the importance 
of different methods of student grouping in educational production (e.g., Ding and Lehrer, 2007; Kang, 
2007).   3
and selective school systems for efficiency and equity of education. All these studies are, 
however, completely silent about when it is optimal to start ability grouping across 
schools to achieve educational goals of a society.
3 
For want of relevant studies, the current paper examines two issues that are of 
primary concern in the construction of school systems: whether and when to group 
students by ability across schools. Given that there are in general two stages of public 
schooling---primary and secondary levels---that produce the ultimate educational 
outcome, we investigate whether it is desirable to adopt ability grouping and when it is 
optimal to start (or not start) such grouping in order to achieve often-conflicting 
educational goals of efficiency and equity.
4 To this end, we extend Hur and Kang's 
(2007) one-period model to the case where the decisions are made in two periods 
reflecting two stages of public education before college. In the analysis each of 
comprehensive and selective systems is characterized by the role of a student's own 
quality prior to school entrance and the parent's choice of residential district in the 
determination of quality of school peers. We then compare efficiency and equity of 
educational outcomes across different school systems by examining educational 
expenditures, the role of family income and student ability in the determination of the 
educational outcome, and the variance and level of such an outcome. 
Our two-period model of school systems gives rise to several points that have failed 
to emerge in previous discussions on school systems. Above all, it suggests that not only 
the frequency of ability grouping in two stages of schooling but its sequence also matter 
in drawing educational implications of school systems. Given that there are two 
methods of grouping students (comprehensive and selective) and two stages of 
schooling (primary and secondary), we have four different school systems to use in 
educating students: (1) the comprehensive-comprehensive (CC) system in which the 
comprehensive system is employed in stage 1 (e.g., primary level) and stage 2 (e.g., 
secondary level) alike; (2) the selective-selective (SS) system in which the selective 
                                            
3  See Hur and Kang (2007) for further theoretical discussions on these four papers and empirical findings 
about the effects of comprehensive and selective systems on efficiency and equity of education. 
4 In this paper our primary concern is about how to allocate students across schools, not across classes 
within a school given that the students are already placed to the school. For issues and impacts of within-
school ability grouping and mixing on education, see, e.g., Argys et al. (1996), Betts and Shkolnik (2000), 
Figlio and Page (2002), Gamoran (1987), and Slavin (1990). In addition, we focus exclusively on public 
school systems, ignoring the presence of private schools. For issues concerning the role of ability 
grouping in the relationship between public and private schools, see, e.g., Epple et al. (2002).   4
system is adopted in both stages; (3) the comprehensive-selective (CS) system in which 
the comprehensive (selective) system is used in stage 1 (stage 2); (4) the selective-
comprehensive (SC) system in which the selective (comprehensive) system is used in 
stage 1 (stage 2). The first three systems (i.e., CC, SS and CS) are often observed in 
existing educational institutions. However, the SC system is hard to find. Below we 
show that the SC system at times reveals more desirable educational implications than 
the CC and CS systems. Thus the sequence of ability grouping can make differences in 
achieving educational goals. 
Second, we find that different households that are characterized by a pair of family 
income and the child's innate ability prefer different combinations of school systems. 
For example, households in which the income is high but the child's ability is low tend 
to like CC but dislike SS; households in which the income is high and the child's ability 
is also high tend to like CS but dislike SC; and so on. Thus the overall performance of a 
school system is determined by how households are distributed over income and child 
ability and how they prefer each school system. Which sequence of school systems is 
adopted in a nation's education system will be ultimately determined by voting of 
households. 
Third, if the entrance exam in the selective system tests a student's endowed ability 
alone but never her nurtured ability, then the systems that adopt the selective method in 
the later stage of education show more favorable educational implications than if the 
exam tests a student's endowed ability as well as her nurtured ability. Whether or not the 
entrance exam should signal the endowed ability alone in the selective system will also 
be determined by voting of households, because different households prefer different 
settings of the entrance exam in the selective system. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 extends Hur and Kang's (2007) 
one-period model to a two-period case in which comprehensive and selective systems 
are combined with different sequences. In section 3 we discuss analytical results of the 
four school systems in terms of efficiency and equity of education. Section 4 introduces 
a new setting of the entrance exam in the selective system and examines its educational 
implications under the four systems. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The model 
 
Let us first set up a utility function of a household that consists of a parent and one 
child: 
   5
2 1 ln ln U U U ρ + =      (1) 
where  ) ( 1
γ β α α θ t t t t t t t e A x A x U − = = ,  1 α βγ + += ,  1 , , , 0 < < ρ γ β α , and  2 , 1 = t .
5 
Here the household's total utility (U ) is expressed by a sum (in natural log) of 
period-1 utility ( 1 U ) and period-2 utility ( 2 U ) that is discounted by a factor  ρ . A 
period-t  utility is determined by the amount of private goods consumption ( t x ) and the 
child's educational outcome ( t A ) at period t . The educational outcome at t  is 
produced by the child's educational outcome in the previous period ( 1 − t A ), the average 
quality of peers in school ( t θ ), and the amount of private educational services ( t e ) that 
can be purchased in a form of private tutoring in the market.
6 The child's time-
invariance ability endowed from birth is denoted by  0 A . 
Now we consider two major school systems that exist in public primary and 
secondary education: comprehensive and selective school systems. At each stage of 
schooling, the comprehensive system is characterized by school districts based on 
residential location. In this system parents choose a school district and their children are 
placed into one school within the school district. In contrast, the selective system is 
characterized by entrance tests. In this system students take an entrance exam and are 
admitted to a school according to their ranking in the exam. 
In our analysis of comprehensive systems, we suppose, for simplicity, that student 
placement into a school is random within a school district, while parents can freely 
choose the school district.
7 We also assume that there is a fixed number of school 
                                            
5  The current Cobb-Douglas form of utility and educational production functions plays an important role 
in drawing differences in educational implications across different school systems in this paper. However, 
the adoption of such a functional form is not unique to the current study. They are often employed by the 
economics of education literature (e.g., Epple et al., 2002; Epple and Romano, 1998; Ferreyra, 
forthcoming; Lazear, 2001; Nechyba, 2000). See Hur and Kang (2007) for further discussions on 
alternative functional forms. 
6 To focus exclusively on the impacts of student allocation across schools, we assume that every public 
school spends an equal amount of resources for a student, setting monetary resource allocation across 
schools and districts aside. For issues related to school financing and the distribution of the resources, see, 
e.g., Fernandez and Rogerson (2003) and Hoxby (2001). 
7 Under comprehensive systems, there are largely two methods of student placement within a school 
district. The first is to assign each student randomly to one school within the district. This method has 
been employed in South Korea since 1969 to allocate students to middle schools and general (or non-
vocational) high schools within a school district. See OECD (1998, Chapters 1 and 2) for details. The   6
districts to serve entire population of students, and that each district is identical in terms 
of the number of schools and school resources such as class size, teacher quality, etc. 
Under the comprehensive system, the quality of school peers ( t θ ) is exogenously given 
to individual students once a school district is decided: within a district, students face 
the same average quality of peers in any school due to randomization. Nonetheless, 
parents may choose the quality of school peers indirectly by moving across school 
districts. The children's quality of a school district is reflected in house prices (Black, 
1999; Gibbons and Machin, 2003). Let us denote the children's average quality of a 
school district by  t d  and its unit price by  dt p . Parents spend a total of  t dtd p  to 
purchase a house in a certain school district; a high house price in a good school district 
is expressed by a high value of  t d , hence  t dtd p . In the model, for simplicity again, we 
suppose that there are no commuting costs between the house and school, and no 
changes in living environment over time. 
In contrast to comprehensive systems, the choice of a school district does not 
matter in the determination of school peer quality under selective systems, because 
schools give admissions to students based on the entrance exam ranking alone, not on 
the school district. Note that the total number of schools and school resources remain 
unchanged compared with those of the comprehensive system; only school districts 
disappear in the selective system. In this system parents choose the quality of school 
peers solely by raising the entrance exam ranking of the child; the quality of school 
peers ( t θ ) is determined by the child's own quality at the end of the previous period 
( 1 − t A ). That is, the level of  1 θ  is decided by that of  0 A ---the endowed quality---and 
the level of  2 θ  by that of  1 A ---the endowed plus nurtured quality just prior to period 
2.
8 
To characterize different systems of student allocation to schools at t , we 
introduce the following model for  t θ : 
 
                                                                                                                                
second is to assign each student to one school within a district in consideration of the preferences of the 
student and parent. Such a method is more common in comprehensive systems than random assignment. 
In our analysis, however, we assume random assignment within a district for conceptual sharpness. 
8 In section 4 we analyze educational implications of selective school systems where the entrance exam 
tests a student's endowed ability  0 A  alone (not  1 − t A ) at each stage of schooling, and compare them 
with those obtained in the current setting of the entrance exam. An interesting result is that inequality of 
the educational outcome under selective systems is reduced in the system relying on  0 A  relative to the 
system relying on  1 − t A . Details are presented in section 4.   7
t t
t t t d A
δ τ θ 1 − =  for  2 , 1 = t                 ( 2 )  
 
The comprehensive system is characterized by  0 = t τ  and  1 = t δ , and the 
selective system by  1 = t τ  and  0 = t δ .  t δ  is equal to one in the comprehensive 
system that employs within-district randomization, because  t θ , the average peer quality 
in a school, is ultimately determined by  t d , the average quality of children in a school 
district.
9 For the selective system we assume that  1 = t τ  for simplicity of analysis. 
Namely, in the selective system the average quality of school peers is equal to a 
student's own quality. If either  1 > t τ  or  1 0 < < t τ , then student allocation is 
infeasible given a pool of students to be assigned to schools.
10  
In sum, a household's utility function at  t  is denoted by: 
 
         ) ( } ) ( {
1
1 1 1
γ β δ β τ α γ β δ τ α α
t t t t t t t t t t t t e d A x e d A A x A x U
t t t t +
− − − = = =       ( 4 )  
                                            
9 If a within-district allocation of students is not random, then  t δ   may deviate from one. 
10 The assumption that  1 = t τ   in the selective system holds strictly only in a very restrictive condition 
that students in a given school have the same value of  1 − t A . For illustration, suppose that there are a total 
of 100 students to be placed to a total of 10 schools in the selective system. Suppose also that the best 10 
students score 10 in the exam that determines  1 − t A ; the second best 10 students score 9; the third best 10 
students score 8; and so on. In such a case the best school (say, school 1) is attended by the best 10 
students with an identical score 10; the second best school (say, school 2) by the second best 10 students 
with score 9; and so on. Each school is attended by students with the same value of  1 − t A . In this case 
alone  t θ   is exactly equal to  1 − t A , hence  1 = t τ ; the entire functional relationship between  t θ  and 
1 − t A  can be described by a discrete step function whereby the value of  t θ  jumps up by 1 as  1 − t A  
rises by 1. In more realistic cases where individual students have different (continuous) scores of  1 − t A , 
the exact relationship between  t θ  and  1 − t A  will also be a similar step function; the difference, 
however, is that within a given school  t θ   falls as  1 − t A  rises, because  t θ  is determined by the 
average value of  1 − t A  among the schoolmates excluding the self. There is a jump in  t θ  across 
different schools as  1 − t A   rises. Such a step function can be approximated by a linear function with slope 
1, i.e.,  1 − = t t A θ . We use such an approximation to characterize the selective system. Given the 
approximated formula, there is likely to exist a deviation of  t θ  from  1 − t A  for an individual student in 
more realistic cases; it will not be large, however, in the selective system because a school is attended by 
students with similar  1 − t A . In our presentation we sacrifice mathematical rigor of the relation between 
t θ  and  1 − t A  for conceptual sharpness of the subsequent analysis but the cost does not seem to be 
terribly large.   8
 
And the total utility is given by: 
 
] ln ln [
] ln ln ln ) 1 )[( 1 ( ] ln [ln
2 2 2
1 1 1 0 1 2 2 1
e d
e d A x x U
γ βδ ρ
γ βδ βτ ρβτ ρ ρ α
+ +
+ + + + + + + =
   (5) 
 
Now consider the household's budget constraint: 
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where  t y  is the post-tax disposable income of the household at t ,  T y  is its total 
present-value disposable income, and  g   is the interest rate of the private credit market. 
The price of  1 x   is assumed to be one for normalization. All the prices are exogenously 
determined in their own perfectly competitive markets. Subject to the budget constraint, 
the household, which is uniquely characterized by a pre-determined set of  0 A ,  1 y  and 
2 y , chooses the total utility maximizing levels of  1 x ,  2 x ,  1 e  and  2 e  together with 
those of  1 d  and  2 d   the choices of which depend on the school system adopted. 
The optimal quantities of the choice variables, the educational outcome and indirect 
utilities are obtained as following:   
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Hereafter, we will drop the asterisks of the variables, unless the optimized value 
may be confused with the variable itself. 
 
3. School Systems and Educational Implications 
 
Now we consider four different school systems of student allocation at different 
stages of schooling (e.g., primary and secondary education): the comprehensive-
comprehensive (CC) system, the selective-selective (SS) system, the comprehensive-
selective (CS) system and the selective-comprehensive (SC) system, as defined 
previously. From the discussions in section 2, the CC system is characterized by 
0 2 1 = =τ τ  and  1 2 1 = =δ δ ; the SS system by  1 2 1 = =τ τ  and  0 2 1 = = δ δ ; the CS 
system by  0 1 = τ ,  1 2 = τ ,  1 1 = δ  and  0 2 = δ ; the SC system by  1 1 = τ ,  0 2 = τ , 
0 1 = δ  and  1 2 = δ . 
Given such characterizations of different school systems, we employ a few criteria 
to compare educational implications across different systems. These criteria include the 
consumption levels ( t x ), educational expenditures ( t et t dt t e p d p E + ≡ ), and the final 
educational outcome ( 2 A ), because they are often examined in theoretical and empirical 
discussions on school systems (see Hur and Kang (2007) for details). Table 1 
summarizes such measures for each school system. 
From equations (7) to (9) we can show that a household with a pre-determined 
income schedule ( 1 y , 2 y ) reveals saving patterns that vary according to school systems. 
In general, the optimal amount of period-1 saving of a household with ( 1 y , 2 y ) is given 
by 
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This suggests that the optimal amount of saving of a household is positive (negative) at 
period 1 if the ratio of  1 y  to  2 y  is larger (smaller) than the saving threshold, 
) ( ) 1 (
) )( 1 (
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STSC  in SC. Given 
these thresholds, it is easy to show that  SC SS CC CS ST ST ST ST > ≥ >  if  γ α ≥  and 
SC CC SS CS ST ST ST ST > > >  if  γ α < . This implies that saving patterns of a household 
with a given income schedule ( 1 y , 2 y ) vary according to school systems, depending on 
the relative (not absolute) size of  1 y  and  2 y . The reason is that a household shows 
patterns of educational spending in periods 1 and 2 that differ by school systems. 
Similar to the saving patterns, the level of a household's consumption also varies by 
school systems. From Table 1 it is easy to show that 
CC CS SC SS x x x x 1 1 1 1 > > >  and 
CC CS SC SS x x x x 2 2 2 2 > > > . In both periods 1 and 2 consumption levels are the largest in SS 
and the smallest in CC. Consumption levels in SC are larger than those in CS, while 
both being intermediate between SS and CC. Such patterns of household consumptions 
are closely related to patterns of educational expenditures in different school systems. 
 
Proposition 1: (Educational Expenditures) Let 
k E1  be the optimal educational 
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(i.e., 1 1 1 1 1 e p d p E e d + ≡ ). Also let 
k E2  be the optimal (present-value) educational 
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k E1  and 
k E2 . Then we have the following rankings for 
the expenditures. 
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Proof:  
(i) Comparisons between two different 
k E1 's are given as following: 
0 ) ( . )] ( ) 1 [(
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SC SS α ρ ρβ ; 
0 . )] 2 ( 1 [ ) 1 ( 1 1 > × + + + + = − const E E
SC CS γ β ρ ρ β ρ .  
Proposition (i) is trivial. 
(ii) Comparisons between two different 
k E2 's are given as following: 
0 . ] ) ( ) 1 [( 2 2 > × + + + = − const E E
SS CC γ γ β ρ α ρ β ; 
0 . )] )}( ( 1 { ) 1 [( 2 2 > × + + + + + + = − const E E
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0 . ) 1 ( 2 2 < × + − = − const E E
SC CC β ρ ;  
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Proposition (ii) is trivial. 
(iii) Comparisons between two different 
k
T E 's are given as following: 
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Proposition (iii) is trivial. QED 
 
Irrespective of the values of α  and γ , a household's educational expenditure at 
period 1 is the largest in CS and the smallest in SC. It is primarily because in CS parents 
overspend on education at period 1 to equip the children for the entrance exam at period 
2. Such a need, however, does not exist at period 1 in SC. As a consequence of this   12
pattern of educational spending at period 1, the household's goods consumption level at 
period 1 is lower in CS than in SC. In contrast, the relative size of the household's 
educational expenditures in CC and SS depends on the values of  α  and γ . If  γ  is 






+ ), that is, if private tutoring at period 1 is relatively 
effective in preparing children for the entrance exam at period 2, then parents spend 
more on education at period 1 in SS than in CC. If γ  is less than the threshold---
private tutoring at period 1 is less effective for the entrance exam at period 2, however, 
parents spend less on education at period 1 in SS than in CC. In contrast to varying 
rankings of the two systems in educational spending, the household's consumption level 
at period 1 is always greater in SS than in CC. 
As for a household's educational expenditure at period 2, different rankings emerge. 
The educational expenditure at period 2 is the largest in SC and the smallest in CS. Such 
a ranking is the exact reverse of that for the period-1 educational expenditure. In 
addition, the period-2 educational expenditure is greater in CC than in SS. One notable 
pattern of the period-2 educational expenditure is that educational spending is in general 
smaller under the selective system of period 2 (SS and CS) than under the 
comprehensive system (SC and CC). Since parents are not able to purchase the quality 
of children's school peers in the selective system at period 2 given the children's period-
1 performance ( 1 A ), they spend less for education and consume more in the selective 
system than in the comprehensive system. 
To the extent that the ranking and absolute size in educational spending may reverse 
across two periods, a comparison of total (present-value) expenditures between different 
systems may be of more interest to households and policy-makers. Proposition 1.(iii) 
shows that the total expenditure is the largest in CC and the smallest in SS; in the 
middle, the expenditure is larger in CS than in SC. Given that parents are not permitted 
to purchase the quality of children's school peers in selective systems, it is little 
surprising that total educational spending is much smaller in SS than in CC. Notable, 
however, is that such spending is larger in CS than in SC. Not only does the frequency 
of ability grouping across schools matter to the patterns of educational spending, but the 
sequence also makes differences in them. Since parents spend more on education at 
period 1 in CS to prepare the upcoming entrance exam than they economize at period 2 
in SC, the total expenditure is larger in CS than in SC. Such differences in spending 
patterns across school systems in turn give rise to differences in the role of family 
income (and student endowed ability) in determining the final educational outcome 
( 2 A ).   13
 
Proposition 2: (Elasticities of  2 A ) Let 
k
A0 η  be the elasticity of  2 A  with respect to 









≡ η ). And let 
k
y η  




























y η η η η > > >  
Proof:  
From Table 1,  1 0 =
CC
A η , 
2
0 ) 1 ( β η + =
SS
A ,  β η + =1 0
CS
A  and  β η + =1 0
SC
A ; 
) ( 2 γ β η + =
CC
y ,  ) 2 ( β γ η + =
SS
y ,  γ β γ β η + + + = ) 1 )( (
CS
y  and  γ β η 2 + =
SC
y .  
Propositions (i) and (ii) are trivial. QED 
 
To the extent that a child's endowed ability matters in the selective system alone, it 
is easy to see that the child-ability elasticity  0 A η  is the largest in SS, which groups 
similar-quality students in one school twice at periods 1 and 2, and the smallest in CC, 
which never exercises such grouping at both periods. In CC, the initial difference in 
endowed ability among children is reflected proportionally without inflation (or 
deflation) into that in the final outcome  2 A . In SS, however, the initial difference in 
ability widens the difference in  2 A   via peer selection in school. The values of  0 A η  are 
equal between CS and SC, and are at an intermediate level, because CS and SC group 
students across schools only once and a child's endowed ability does not vary over time. 
Echoing the patterns of total educational spending in different school systems, the 
parental-income elasticity  y η   is the largest in CC but the smallest in SS. To the extent 
that a child's endowed ability does not function in peer selection in comprehensive 
systems, the role of the parent's background in the determination of the educational 
output is the strongest in CC but the weakest in SS. Similar to the comparison of  T E  
between CS and SC, the parental-income elasticity  y η   in CS is larger than that in SC,   14
while both of them are at an intermediate level. Again, both the frequency and sequence 
of ability mixing across schools matter to the role of the parent's background in the 
determination of the final output, because in CS (but not in SC) educational investments 
at period 1 may change the quality of school peers at period 2, which in turn improves a 
student's educational outcome.   
A rare empirical study by Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) examining the 
impacts of student ability on educational attainments across different secondary school 
systems in the U.K. agrees with our theoretical prediction; ability has a stronger 
influence on the outcome in a selective system (CS in our model) than in a 
comprehensive system (CC). However, empirical evidence on the effects of family 
background on educational outcomes is rather mixed. While Galindo-Rueda and 
Vignoles (2005) show the role of parental background increased with the transition from 
a selective to a comprehensive system in U.K. secondary education, Dustmann (2004) 
and Meghir and Palme (2005) find selective systems (CS) in secondary education 
reinforce the impact of family background relative to comprehensive systems (CC) in 
Germany and Sweden, respectively. Although conflicting empirical evidence demands 
further investigation, institutional features that are missed in our theoretical model and 
different empirical measures of the educational outcome may be responsible for such a 
discrepancy. 
In addition to the elasticities of the education output with respect to student ability 
and parental income, we next examine another measure of educational equity: the 
variance of educational outcome--- ) (ln 2 A V  more  specifically.  
 
Proposition 3: (Variance of  2 ln A ) Let  k Ω  be the variance of  2 ln A  in school 
system  k . Let us suppose that, as often empirically found, 0 ) ln , (ln 0 > T y A Cov . 
 
(i)  SC CS Ω > Ω   
(ii)  Other rankings of variances among  CC Ω ,  SS Ω ,  CS Ω  and  SC Ω  are not 
uniquely determined.   
Proof:  From  Table  1, 
) ln , (ln ) ( 4 ) (ln ) ( 4 ) (ln 0
2
0 T T CC y A Cov y V A V γ β γ β + + + + = Ω ;  




T T SS y A Cov y V A V β β γ β γ β + + + + + + = Ω ;    15
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T T SC y A Cov y V A V γ β β γ β β + + + + + + = Ω . 
Given that  0 ) ln , (ln 0 > T y A Cov , propositions (i) and (ii) are trivial. QED 
 
Out of a total of six comparisons that can be made for  CC Ω ,  SS Ω ,  CS Ω  and  SC Ω , 
the ranking is uniquely determined only between  CS Ω  and  SC Ω .  ) (ln 2 A V   is larger 
in CS than in SC. Such a result is primarily driven by the fact that 
γ β γ β γ β 2 ) 1 )( ( + > + + + . That is, while the initial difference in child ability 
contributes to  ) (ln 2 A V  equally in CS and SC, inequality in parental income and the 
fact that rich parents tend to have smarter children amplify  ) (ln 2 A V  in CS relative to 
SC. Parental income plays a stronger role in the determination of the educational output 
in the former than in the latter (proposition 2.(ii)). Similar to the comparisons of other 
criteria, the sequence as well as the frequency of ability grouping across schools matters 
to the variance in the final outcome. 
For the other five comparisons, the rankings fail to be uniquely determined. Since 
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 4 > + > + β β  and 
2 2 2 2 2 ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ] ) 1 )( [( ) ( 4 β γ γ β γ β γ β γ β + > + > + + + > + , 
the ranking of the component of  ) (ln 2 A V  that is related to each of  ) (ln 0 A V  and 
) (ln T y V  is determined in the same order that is shown in proposition 2.(i) and 2.(ii). 
However, the role of  ) ln , (ln 0 T y A Cov  in the determination of  ) (ln 2 A V  is not 
uniform across school systems. Therefore, without detail information on the values of 
β ,  γ , ) (ln 0 A V ,  ) (ln T y V  and  ) ln , (ln 0 T y A Cov , we do not know a priori which 
system yields what level of inequality in the final outcome.   
This finding is in fact in contrast to the conventional belief that the inequality of the 
educational outcome is larger in selective systems than in comprehensive systems (see 
Hur and Kang (2007) for the similar finding). In each pair of comprehensive and 
selective systems the variance of the final outcome depends on a variety of factors such 
as  β ,  γ , ) (ln 0 A V ,  ) (ln T y V  and  ) ln , (ln 0 T y A Cov . The degree of contribution of 
each factor to  ) (ln 2 A V   varies according to the school system. 
Although we do not know definitely which system yields what level of variance in 
the final outcome, we can at least attempt to draw a rough picture of inequality in 
different school systems by substituting plausible values for  ) (ln 0 A V ,  ) (ln T y V  and 
) ln , (ln 0 T y A Cov . Below we assign values to constituents of  ) (ln 2 A V  that are 
plausible from previous empirical research. A value of one is assigned to each of   16
) (ln 0 A V  and  ) (ln T y V  for normalization, and 0.4 to  ) ln , (ln 0 T y A Cov , since studies 
on intergenerational income and educational mobility suggest that  ) ln , (ln 0 T y A Cov  is 
around 0.4 (Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992; Epple and Romano, 1998). Given such 
values, the rankings of  ) (ln 2 A V  between different school systems are illustrated in 
Table 2 for varying pairs of  β  and γ . There are four unique areas in the table. Area I 
is pairs of β  and γ  for which  ) (ln 2 A V  is ranked by  CC SC CS SS Ω > Ω > Ω > Ω ; 
area II is those for which  CC SC CS SS Ω = Ω > Ω > Ω ; area III is those for which 
SC CC CS SS Ω > Ω > Ω > Ω ; area IV is those for which  SC CC SS CS Ω > Ω > Ω > Ω . 
Two patterns are noteworthy in Table 2 for the given values of  ) (ln 0 A V ,  ) (ln T y V  
and ) ln , (ln 0 T y A Cov . First, for all feasible pairs of  β  and γ ,  ) (ln 2 A V  is larger in  
the systems that employ the selective method in period 2 (SS and CS) than in those that 
adopt the comprehensive method in period 2 (CC and SC). This suggests that the 
comprehensive method in the later stages of schooling is effective in mitigating the 
inequality of the educational outcome. Second, for a given value of  β  below 0.4, the 
ranking of  SS Ω  and  CS Ω  reverses  as γ   rises above 0.5; for a given value of  β , the 
ranking of  SC Ω  and  CC Ω  reverses as γ  rises. They suggest that as the role of 
monetary expenditures (γ ) increases in educational production, the comprehensive 
method in the early stage of schooling yields a higher variance in the final outcome than 
the selective method; the variance-reducing function of the comprehensive system 
weakens as γ  rises. Yet the first pattern that the variance is smaller under the 
comprehensive system at period 2 than under the selective system holds for all feasible 
pairs of  β  and γ . 
Previous research suggests that β  is approximately between 0.2 and 0.4 for 
elementary and secondary school students (Hanushek et al., 2003; Hoxby, 2000; Kang, 
2007) and that  γ  is between 0.1 and 0.2 (Card and Krueger (1996, p.37)). Therefore, 
for the current given values of  ) (ln 0 A V ,  ) (ln T y V  and  ) ln , (ln 0 T y A Cov , the most 
plausible rankings would be given by  CC SC CS SS Ω > Ω > Ω > Ω . 
Empirical studies are rare that examine the impacts of different school systems on 
educational inequality. Nonetheless, existing studies such as Gorard and Smith (2004) 
and Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) conform to our theoretical prediction. They 
present that a selective system in secondary education (CS in our model) exacerbates 
the inequality in educational outcomes relative to a comprehensive system (CC in our 
model). 
 
Proposition 4: (Size of  2 A )  
   17
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2   is not related to  0 A   but it is positively related to  T y . 
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Since each of the constants  CC Γ ,  SS Γ ,  CS Γ  and  SC Γ  contains prices ( 1 d p ,  2 d p ,  1 e p  
and  2 e p ), its value is indeterminate without further information on the markets in 
different school systems. Hence comes proposition (i). Proposition (ii) are trivial given 
the preceding formulas. QED 
 
Proposition 4.(i) suggests that it is difficult a priori to decide which sequence of 
school systems yields greater educational outputs. This is in contrast to previous studies 
that usually support selective systems as an efficient method of student allocation to 
schools (e.g., Fernandez and Gali, 1999; Lazear, 2001). These studies in general ignore 
the possibility that parents may adjust their optimal choices of consumption and 
educational investments to different grouping methods in school. If parents respond to 
how to group students across schools, a pool of students to be grouped in a school may 
be subject to change when different systems of student allocation are adopted in 
different stages of schooling (e.g., Epple et al, 2002). Our model addresses such a 
possibility via prices ( 1 d p ,  2 d p ,  1 e p  and  2 e p ) at different stages of schooling. 
Because sorting of students into schools varies by school systems, the ranking of the 
ultimate educational outcome mediated through peer effects is indeterminate between 
any two systems. We can only infer that high prices of d  and e  lead to poor 
educational outcomes. 
In line with such theoretical predictions, empirical studies report inconclusive 
evidence on the impact of school systems on overall educational outcomes. While Kang   18
et al. (2007) show that a transition from a selective (CS) to a comprehensive (CC) 
system in secondary education significantly increased the average educational outcome 
(i.e., adulthood earnings) in South Korea, Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) find that 
school systems fail to yield significant differences in the average outcome (i.e., test 
score in secondary school), using international data sets.
11 
Proposition 4.(ii) implies that households characterized by different combinations of 
( 2 1 0 , , y y A ) prefer different pairs of school systems. Namely, the rankings depend on the 
values of  0 A  and  T y . In the absence of detail information on the parameter values and 
prices, however, it is difficult to know a priori which pairs of school systems are liked 
or disliked by what types of households characterized by ( T y A , 0 ). In order to draw a 
rough picture of the pairs of school systems preferred by different households, as in the 
case of variance comparisons, we employ a simulation method by substituting plausible 
values for parameters and prices.   
The set-up of the simulation is as follows: A value of 0.4 is assigned to  β , because 
peer effects literature suggests values between 0.2 and 0.4 for the effect of average peer 
quality on a student's achievement (Hanushek et al., 2003; Hoxby, 2000; Kang, 2007); a 
value of 0.1 is allocated to  γ , because Card and Krueger (1996, p.37) summarize that a 
10 percent increase in public school spending leads to about a 1-2 percent increase in 
subsequent earnings; thus  α  is equal to 0.5; we set all of the prices  1 d p ,  2 d p ,  1 e p  
and  2 e p  equal to one, as we have no useful information on them and wish to avoid 
arbitrary price differences; finally, we set  05 . 0 = g  and  95 . 0 = ρ . 
Figure 1 shows six lines each of which represents the households that are indifferent 
                                            
11 Our theoretical model casts doubt on the capability of transnational comparisons to reveal the true 
strength of ability grouping (as opposed to ability mixing) in raising the level of educational outputs. 
Because each country possesses unique educational markets for school districts and private educational 
services, the prices are likely to differ across countries. Even if parents’ preferences are identical, the 
educational output may vary across countries solely by the differences in the prices, not by the method of 
ability grouping in school. Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) attempt to overcome such a problem by 
applying difference-in-difference methods that use educational outputs of primary and secondary 
schooling. An implicit assumption of the paper is that there are no substantial differences in markets for 
school districts and private educational services between primary and secondary education in each 
country. A before-after comparison for a single country such as Kang et al. (2007) may also be a valid 
empirical strategy; a similar assumption is that there are no changes in the educational markets in the 
vicinity of the exogenous policy change.   19
between two school systems in terms of  2 A .
12  Line I represents the households that are 
indifferent between CC and SS; Line II those indifferent between CC and CS; Line III 
those indifferent between CC and SC; Line IV those indifferent between SS and CS; 
Line V those indifferent between SS and SC; Line VI those indifferent between CS and 
SC. The six lines divide the entire region by a total of 17 unique areas that are 
individually numbered from (1) to (17). Table 3 reports the orderings of  2 A   among 
four different school systems in a given area. For example, 
SS SC CS CC A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >  
for households whose ( T y A , 0 ) is located in area (1), etc.   
 
<Insert Figure 1 and Table 3 here.> 
 
From the orderings of  2 A  in the 17 areas, CC is most preferred by the households 
in areas (1) and (9), but least preferred by those in areas (6), (7), (8), (12), (15) and (17); 
SS is most preferred by those in areas (8), (16) and (17), but least preferred by those in 
areas (1), (2), (5), (9), (10) and (11); CS is most preferred by those in areas (2), (3), (4), 
(5), (6) and (7), but least preferred by those in areas (13), (14) and (16); SC is most 
preferred by those in areas (10), (11), (12), (13), (14) and (15), but least preferred by 
those in areas (3) and (4).   
Households with low  0 A  and high  T y  tend to like CC but dislike SS; households 
with high  0 A  and low  T y  tend to like SS but dislike CC; households with high  0 A  
and high  T y  tend to like CS but dislike SC; households with low  0 A  and low  T y  
tend to like SC but dislike CS. In sum, the overall performance of a school system does 
not only depend on the frequency and sequence of ability grouping across schools. It is 
also determined by how households are distributed over  0 A  and  T y  and how they 
prefer each school system. Thus which sequence of school systems is adopted in a 
nation's education system will be ultimately determined by voting of households. Our 
analysis sheds light on decisions by households and policy-makers by offering 
comparisons about educational implications that can be produced by four different 
sequences of school systems. 
Our analysis also suggests that there always exist conflicts in interests surrounding 
the choice of school systems, unless policy-makers offer different combinations of 
school systems in different regions so that households self-select into the most preferred 
                                            





* ln ln U U U ρ + = ) as a criterion of such comparisons. The results based on the utility, however, 
produce qualitatively similar pictures given here. Such results are available upon request.   20
school system. To the extent that policy-makers have to decide over a limited set of 
school systems in a nation, a nation's school system will ultimately be determined by 
how they distribute weights to each of educational criteria (e.g., consumption level, the 
inequality and overall level of the educational outcome, etc) in order to achieve 
educational goals. The presence of different school systems, as observed in different 
nations around the globe, will reflect transnational differences in such weights given to 
each of a variety of educational targets. 
 
4. Educational Implications When the Entrance Exams Signal a Student's 
Endowed Ability Alone 
 
In the preceding sections we suppose that the entrance exams in selective systems 
test academic quality of students just prior to the start of school placement. Namely, the 
entrance exam for period-1 schooling tests the level of  0 A , while the exam for period-2 
schooling tests the level of  1 A . Such exams are, however, one particular type of 
entrance exams; one can imagine a different setting of entrance exams. For example, an 
exam can test a student's endowed ability ( 0 A ) alone, but not her nurtured ability. An IQ 
test seems relatively close to such a test, although to what extent an IQ test measures a 
person's endowed ability remains controversial. Ferdinandez and Gail (1999) and Hur 
and Kang (2007) suggest that how strongly the entrance exam in the selective system 
signals a student's endowed ability relative to her nurtured ability matters for 
educational implications of comprehensive and selective systems. In this section, we 
extend the ideas of Ferdinandez and Gail (1999) and Hur and Kang (2007) to school 
systems of different stages of schooling by employing (hypothetical) entrance exams 
that signal a student's endowed ability alone (but not her nurtured ability) for school 
admission. We modify the model for  t θ  by  replacing  1 − t A  with  0 A , as follows: 
) 2 , 1 ( 0 = = t d A
t t
t t
δ τ θ             ( 1 6 )  
As discussed in section 3, given within-district randomization in comprehensive 
systems, CC is characterized by  0 2 1 = =τ τ  and  1 2 1 = = δ δ ; SS by  1 2 1 = =τ τ  and 
0 2 1 = = δ δ ; CS by  0 1 = τ ,  1 2 = τ ,  1 1 = δ  and  0 2 = δ ; SC by  1 1 = τ ,  0 2 = τ , 
0 1 = δ  and  1 2 = δ . Note that the entrance exam of the period-1 selective system 
remains the same as earlier, and that only the entrance exam of the period-2 selective 
system has changed. Thus a household's choices under CS and SS alone are expected to 
be affected, while those under CC and SC remain unaffected.   21
A household's new utility function at  t  is given by: 
 
         ) ( } ) ( { 1 0 0 1
γ β δ β τ α γ β δ τ α α
t t t t t t t t t t t e d A A x e d A A x A x U
t t t t
− − = = =        ( 1 7 )   
 
The total utility is denoted by: 
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Given the same budget constraint as in section 3, the optimal quantities of choice 
variables, the educational outcome and indirect utilities are obtained as following:   
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We will also drop the asterisks of the variables. To distinguish from those in section 
3, all the optimal values of the variables in this section are over-lined. 
Table 4 summarizes the consumption levels ( t x ), educational expenditures ( t E ), and 
the final educational outcome ( 2 A ) for each school system. From Table 4 it is easy to 
show that 
CC CS SC SS x x x x 1 1 1 1 > > >  and 
CC CS SC SS x x x x 2 2 2 2 > > > , which mirror the 
rankings in consumption levels in section 3. In both periods 1 and 2 the consumption 
levels are the largest in SS and the smallest in CC. The levels are larger in SC than those 
in CS, while both levels are intermediate between SS and CC.   
















t x x >  for each  ) 2 , 1 (= t . If the entrance exam at period 2 tests the level of  0 A  
alone, but not  1 A , the consumption levels at both periods rises in SS and CS, which 
employ the selective method at period 2, while they do not change in CC and SC, which 
employ the comprehensive method at period 2. Since over-investment for  1 A  in  period 
1 does not lead to the change in school peer quality in period 2 even under SS and CS, 
parents spend less on education and consume more in the new institutional setting than 
in the old setting where the entrance exam tests the level of  1 A . This can be also seen in 
patterns of educational expenditures that follow. 
 
Proposition 5: (Educational Expenditures)  
(i) 
SC CC SS CS E E E E 1 1 1 1 > > > .  
(ii) 









T E E E E > > > . 
(iv) 
CC CC E E 1 1 = ; 
SC SC E E 1 1 = ; 
SS SS E E 1 1 < ; 
CS CS E E 1 1 <  
(v) 
CC CC E E 2 2 = ; 
SC SC E E 2 2 = ; 
SS SS E E 2 2 > ; 

















T E E <  
 
Proof:  
(i) Comparisons between two different 
k E1 's are given as following: 
0 . ] ) 2 1 ( [ 1 1 < × + + − = − const E E
SS CC β ρ ρα β ;  0 . 1 1 < × − = − const E E
CS CC ρβ ; 
0 . ) 1 ( 1 1 > × + = − const E E
SC CC ρ β ;  0 . ] ) 1 [( 1 1 < × + + − = − const E E
CS SS ργ α ρ β ; 
0 . 1 1 > × = − const E E
SC SS ρβ ;  0 . ] 2 ) 1 [( 1 1 > × + + + = − const E E
SC CS ργ ρβ α ρ β . 
Proposition (i) is trivial. 
(ii) Comparisons between two different 
k E2 's are given as following:   23
0 . ) 1 ( 2 2 > × + = − const E E
SS CC αβ ρ ;  0 . ) 1 ( 2 2 > × + = − const E E
CS CC β ρ ; 
0 . ) 1 ( 2 2 < × + − = − const E E
SC CC β ρ ;  0 . 2 2 > × = − const E E
CS SS ρβ ; 
0 . ) )( 1 ( 2 2 < × + + − = − const E E
SC SS β γ α ρ ; 
0 . ] ) 3 1 ( ) )( 1 [( 2 2 < × + + + + − = − const E E
SC CS γ ρ β α ρ β . 
Proposition (ii) is trivial.   
(iii) Comparisons between two different 
k
T E 's are given as following: 
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T αβ ρ . 
Proposition (iii) is trivial. 
(iv) Comparisons between 
k E1  and 
k E1   are given as following: 
From Tables 1 and 4, it is obvious that 
CC CC E E 1 1 =  and 
SC SC E E 1 1 = . 
0 . ] ) 1 [( 1 1 > × + + = − const E E
SS SS ργ α ρ ρβγ ; 
0 . ] ) 1 )[( ( 1 1 > × + + + = − const E E
CS CS ργ α ρ γ β ρβ . 
(v) Comparisons between 
k E2  and 
k E2   are given as following: 
It is obvious that 
CC CC E E 2 2 =  and 
SC SC E E 2 2 = . 
0 . 2 2 < × − = − const E E
SS SS ρβγ ;  0 . ) ( 2 2 < × + − = − const E E
CS CS γ β ρβ . 
(vi) Comparisons between 
k
T E  and 
k
T E   are given as following: 








T E E = . 




T αβ ρ ρ ;  




T γ β αβ ρ ρ . QED 
 
If the entrance exam in the period-2 selective system tests  0 A   alone, patterns of 
educational spending across school systems remain similar to those in proposition 1. A 
household's educational expenditure at period 1 is the largest in CS and the smallest in 
SC. In contrast to proposition 1.(i), the expenditure at period 1 is always lower in CS 
than in SC. The educational expenditure at period 2 is the largest in SC and the smallest 
in CS; the period-2 expenditure in CC are greater than that in SS, while both being at an 
intermediate level. The total expenditure is the largest in CC and the smallest in SS; in 
the middle, it is larger in CS than in SC. 
Propositions 5.(iv) to 5.(vi) suggest that once the entrance exam in the period-2 
selective system tests  0 A   alone, the sizes of educational expenditure in SS and SC 
changes relative to those in the old exam setting, but the direction varies by the period. 
While the expenditures in CC and SC remain constant in both periods, the educational 
expenditures in SS and CS fall in period 1 but rise in period 2; overall, the total 
educational expenditures in SS and CS alike fall if the  0 A -biased entrance exam is   24
offered at period 2. Such changes take place primarily because over-investment for  1 A  
at period 1 does not lead to the improvement in school peer quality at period 2 in SS and 
CS under the new exam setting; parents would rather choose to consume more in the 
new institutional setting. Such patterns in educational spending and consumption in turn 
give rise to differences in the role of family income (and student endowed ability) in 
determining the final educational outcome ( 2 A ) under the new exam setting. 
 




















































y η η = . 
Proof:  
From Table 4,  1 0 =
CC
A η ,  β η 2 1 0 + =
SS




A .  ) ( 2 γ β η + =
CC
y , 
γ η 2 =
SS




y . Propositions (i) and (ii) are trivial. Comparisons 
with Table 1 show propositions (iii) and (iv). QED 
 
As in proposition 2, the child-ability elasticity  0 A η  is the largest in SS and the 
smallest in CC, while it is at an intermediate level in CS and SC; the family-income 
elasticity  y η  is the largest in CC and the smallest in SS, while it is at an intermediate 
level in CS and SC. A difference from proposition 2.(ii) is that  y η   is equal between CS 
and SC, since educational spending at period 1 does not lead to the change in school 
peer quality at period 2. 
Proposition 6.(iii) suggests that since peer quality in period-2 schooling is less 
affected by the initial difference in  0 A   under the new setting,  0 A η   falls in SS, while it 
remains constant in CC, CS and SC. Proposition 6.(iv) suggests that  y η   falls in SS and 
CS under the new setting of the entrance exam, because over-investment for  1 A  fail  to   25
change the peer quality in period-2 schooling. Such patterns in elastisticies are reflected 
in the variance in  2 ln A   for each school system. 
 
Proposition 7: (Variance of  2 ln A ) Let us suppose that  0 ) ln , (ln 0 > T y A Cov . 
(i)  SC CS Ω = Ω   
(ii)  Other rankings of variances among  CC Ω ,  SS Ω ,  CS Ω  and  SC Ω  are not 
uniquely determined. 
(iii)  CC CC Ω = Ω ;  SS SS Ω < Ω ;  CS CS Ω < Ω ;  SC SC Ω = Ω . 
Proof:  From  Table  4, 
) ln , (ln ) ( 4 ) (ln ) ( 4 ) (ln 0
2
0 T T CC y A Cov y V A V γ β γ β + + + + = Ω ;  




T T SS y A Cov y V A V β γ γ β + + + + = Ω ;  




T T SC CS y A Cov y V A V γ β β γ β β + + + + + + = Ω = Ω . 
Given that  0 ) ln , (ln 0 > T y A Cov , propositions (i) and (ii) are trivial. 
From comparisons with Table 4, it is obvious that  CC CC Ω = Ω  and  SC SC Ω = Ω ; 
; 0 ) ln , (ln ) 4 1 (





> + + +
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0 )} ln , (ln ) 1 ( 2 ) (ln )] ( ) 2 ( 2 [ ){ ( 0 > + + + + + + = Ω − Ω T T CS CS y A Cov y V β β γ β β γ β β γ β
. QED 
 
As in proposition 3, the ranking is uniquely determined only between  CS Ω  and 
SC Ω .  ) (ln 2 A V   is equal between CS and SC. Since the entrance exams tests  0 A  alone 
in both periods 1 and 2, educational spending at period 1 does not lead to the change in 
school peer quality at period 2; the initial difference in  0 A  also change school peer 
quality equally in CS and SC. Other rankings fail to be uniquely determined, because   26
the variance depends on many factors that countervail across different school systems. 
Although the ranking of the component of  ) (ln 2 A V   that is related to each of  ) (ln 0 A V  
and  ) (ln T y V  is determined as in propositions 6.(i) and 6.(ii), respectively, the role of 
) ln , (ln 0 T y A Cov  in the determination of  ) (ln 2 A V  is not uniform across school 
systems. 
Proposition 7.(iii) suggests that while it remains constant in CC and SC,  ) (ln 2 A V  
falls in SS and CS under the new setting of the entrance exam. Again, it is primarily 
because peer quality in period-2 schooling is less affected by the initial difference in 
0 A   under the new setting, and over-investment for  1 A   fails to increase the peer quality 
in period-2 schooling. 
Since we do not know a priori which system yields what level of inequality in the 
final outcome, we attempt to draw a rough picture of  ) (ln 2 A V  in different school 
systems by substituting  ) (ln 0 A V  for one,  ) (ln T y V  for one and  ) ln , (ln 0 T y A Cov  
for 0.4, as in section 3. Given such values, the rankings of  ) (ln 2 A V  are illustrated in 
Table 5 for varying pairs of  β  and γ . There are six unique areas in the table. 
A notable pattern is that for a given value of  β  below 0.3, the ranking of  SS Ω  
and  CC Ω  dramatically reverses as γ  rises above 0.5. For  β  below 0.3,  SS Ω  is the 
largest and  CC Ω  is the smallest if γ  is below 0.5. In stark contrast,  SS Ω  is the 
smallest and  CC Ω  is the largest if  γ  is above 0.5. This suggests that, if the role of 
peer quality (β ) is relatively weak in educational production but that of educational 
expenditure (γ ) is relatively strong, comprehensive systems amplify initial inequality of 
family income but selective systems narrow it in the determination of the final 
educational output. In such a case, selective systems are more effective to reduce 
inequality in educational attainments to the extent that the entrance exams test  0 A  
alone in selective systems. See Hur and Kang (2007) for the similar finding. 
Previous research, however, suggests that  β   is approximately between 0.2 and 0.4 
and that  γ   is between 0.1 and 0.2. Therefore, for the current given values of  ) (ln 0 A V , 
) (ln T y V  and  ) ln , (ln 0 T y A Cov , the most plausible rankings would be given by 
CC SC CS SS Ω > Ω = Ω > Ω .   27
 
Proposition 8: (Size of  2 A )  
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) , , , , ; ( SC CS SS CC l k l k = ≠ . Each ranking depends on a household's  0 A  
and  T y , values of parameters and prices given in each school system. 
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Proof:  From  Table  4, 


















































































Since each of the constants  CC Φ ,  SS Φ ,  CS Φ  and  SC Φ  contains prices ( 1 d p ,  2 d p , 
1 e p  and  2 e p ), its value is indeterminate without further information on the markets in 
different school systems. Hence comes proposition (i). Proposition (ii) are trivial given 
the preceding formulas. Proposition (iii) is obvious from comparisons between Tables 1 
and 4. QED 
 
Proposition 8.(i) suggests that it is difficult a priori to decide which sequence of 
school systems yields greater educational outputs, as in proposition 4.(i). However, 
proposition 8.(ii) implies that households characterized by different combinations of 
( 2 1 0 , , y y A ) prefer different pairs of school systems. The rankings depend on the values 
of  0 A  and  T y . Here we also employ a simulation method by substituting the same 
values for parameters and prices as in section 4.   
Figure 2 shows five lines each of which represents the households that are 
indifferent between two school systems in terms of  2 A . (For the current given values, 
CS is preferred to SC by every household.) Each line represents the households that are 
indifferent between the same pairs of the school systems as in Figure 1. The five lines   28
divide the entire region by a total of 6 unique areas. Table 3 (right panel) reports the 
orderings of  2 A   among four school systems in a given area.   
From the orderings of  2 A , CC is most preferred by the households in area (1), but 
least preferred by those in areas (4), (5) and (6); SS is most preferred by those in area 
(6), but least preferred by those in areas (1), (2) and (3); CS is most preferred by those 
in areas (2), (3), (4) and (5). Namely, households with low  0 A  and high  T y  tend to 
like CC but dislike SS; households with high  0 A  and low  T y  tend to like SS but 
dislike CC; households with medium  0 A  and medium  T y  tend to like CS but dislike 
SS or CC, depending on their characteristics. The conclusion is similar to that in section 
3. In the new setting of the entrance exam also, the overall performance of a school 
system does not only depend on the frequency and sequence of ability grouping across 
schools, but on how households are distributed over  0 A  and  T y  and how they prefer 
each school system. 
Proposition 8.(iii) suggests that the rankings between 
SS A2  and 
SS A2 , on the one 
hand, and between 
CS A2  and 
CS A2 , on the other, also vary by household characteristics, 
while the final outcomes are equal between the old and new settings in CC and SC. 
SS A2  is greater (smaller) than 
SS A2  for households with small (large) values of both 
0 A  and  T y . In contrast, 
CS A2  is greater (smaller) than 
CS A2  for households with 
small (large)  T y , while  0 A  does not affect the preference ranking. Thus whether or 
not the entrance exam should be biased toward  0 A  in the selective system will be 
ultimately determined by voting of households, given the fact that each type of the exam 
chosen has the educational implications that are outlined in our preceding discussions. 
This reveals the conflicts in interests surrounding the choice of school systems and 
exam settings as shown in section 3. Similarly, the ultimate decision will be made based 
on a society's weights given to a variety of educational targets. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, using a simple two-period model of household choices, we consider 
four different school systems of student allocation at different stages of schooling and 
their educational implications. Our model first suggests that both the frequency and 
sequence of ability grouping play an important role in producing educational 
implications of school systems. We next find that different households that are 
characterized by a pair of family income and the child's innate ability prefer different 
combinations of school systems. As a result, the overall performance of a school system   29
is determined by how households are distributed over income and a child's ability. 
Which sequence of school systems is adopted in a nation's education system will be 
ultimately determined by voting of households. Finally, if the entrance exam in the 
selective system tests a student's endowed ability alone but never her nurtured ability, 
then the systems that adopt the selective method in the later stage of education show 
more favorable educational implications than if the exam tests a student's endowed 
ability as well as her nurtured ability. Whether or not the entrance exam should signal 
the endowed ability alone in the selective system will also be determined by voting of 
households, because different households prefer different settings of the entrance exam 
in the selective system. 
Although useful policy implications can be drawn from our approach, it is not, of 
course, free of drawbacks. First, the model is based on partial equilibrium, where prices 
are fixed across different school systems. In the context of general equilibrium, however, 
the prices vary by the structure of markets. We do not model the changes in markets in 
response to those in demand for each in different school systems. Second, our education 
production is based on a Cobb-Douglas form, where peer-effects increase with a 
student's ability (i.e., 
γ β θ e b A = ). Such a form of peer effects are frequently used in 
economic theories of education (e.g., Fernandez and Gali, 1999; Lazear, 2001). By 
assuming a Cobb-Douglas form, we avoid complications that may be introduced by 
different functional forms of educational production. Nevertheless, there is a need to 
employ different specifications of peer effects over ability in educational production for 
future research.  30
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Table 1: Optimal levels of consumption and educational expenditures and the final 
educational outcome under different school systems 
School 
system 
Consumption goods,  1 x  Consumption  goods,  2 x  
CC  T
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Table 1: Optimal levels of consumption and educational expenditures and the final 
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Note: CC denotes the comprehensive system in both periods 1 and 2; SS the selective system in both periods; 
CS the comprehensive system in period 1 and the selective system in period 2; SC the selective system in 
period 1 and the comprehensive system in period 2. 
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Table 2. Rankings of the variance in  2 ln A   for different pairs of  β  and γ  
 
  γ  
β   0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8 
0.1                 
0.2                
0.3               
0.4              
0.5             
0.6               
0.7              
0.8             
            
    Area I.  CC SC CS SS Ω > Ω > Ω > Ω    
    Area II.  CC SC CS SS Ω = Ω > Ω > Ω    
    Area III.  SC CC CS SS Ω > Ω > Ω > Ω    
    Area IV.  SC CC SS CS Ω > Ω > Ω > Ω    
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Table 3. Rankings of  2 A  and  2 A   in different areas of Figures 1 and 2 
 
Area  Ordering in Figure 1    Area Ordering in Figure 2 
      
(1) 
SS SC CS CC A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >  (1) 
SS SC CS CC A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >  
(2) 
SS SC CC CS A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >  (2) 
SS SC CC CS A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >  
(3) 
SC SS CC CS A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >  (3) 
SS CC SC CS A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >  
(4) 
SC CC SS CS A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >  (4) 
CC SS SC CS A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >  
(5) 
SS CC SC CS A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >  (5) 
CC SC SS CS A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >  
(6) 
CC SS SC CS A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >  (6) 
CC SC CS SS A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >  
(7) 
CC SC SS CS A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >     
(8) 
CC SC CS SS A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >     
(9) 
SS CS SC CC A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >     
(10) 
SS CS CC SC A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >     
(11) 
SS CC CS SC A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >     
(12) 
CC SS CS SC A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >     
(13) 
CS SS CC SC A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >     
(14) 
CS CC SS SC A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >     
(15) 
CC CS SS SC A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >     
(16) 
CS CC SC SS A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >     
(17) 
CC CS SC SS A A A A 2 2 2 2 > > >     
   37
Table 4: Optimal levels of consumption and educational expenditures and the final 
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Table 4: Optimal levels of consumption and educational expenditures and the final 
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Note: CC denotes the comprehensive system in both periods 1 and 2; SS the selective system in both periods; 
CS the comprehensive system in period 1 and the selective system in period 2; SC the selective system in 
period 1 and the comprehensive system in period 2. 
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Table 5. Rankings of the variance in  2 ln A   for different pairs of  β  and γ  
 
  γ  
β   0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8 
0.1                 
0.2                
0.3               
0.4              
0.5             
0.6               
0.7              
0.8             
            
   
Area I.    CC SC CS SS Ω > Ω = Ω > Ω  
 
   
Area II.  CC SC CS SS Ω = Ω = Ω > Ω  
 
   
Area III.  SC CS CC SS Ω = Ω > Ω > Ω  
 
   
Area IV.  SC CS SS CC Ω = Ω > Ω = Ω  
 
   
Area V.    SS SC CS CC Ω > Ω = Ω > Ω  
 
   
Area VI.  SS SC CS CC Ω = Ω = Ω > Ω  
 























T y  
0 A  
Line I (CC vs SS)  Line II (CC vs CS) 
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Figure 1. Combinations of  0 A  and  T y   that yield highest  2 A    41
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Figure 2. Combinations of  0 A  and  T y   that yield highest  2 A  
 
 
 
 